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statute for the convenience of the draftsman. This sort of thing will not give
the students much conception of the place of financial machinery in our economy. The book ends with chapters on liability of parties, discharge, bona fide
purchasers and so on, topics usual to the bills and notes course.
But Beutel's arrangement is at least logical, if you grant his major premise.
It is his view, if I do not misread him, that the courts should approach any uniform commercial statute with only the legislative text (and perhaps the draftsman's notes) before them. Prior cases are irrelevant. It is an exercise in pure
mathematics, guided by a proper use of 'conflicting statutory techniques of
interpretation," to come up with the right answer. Hence, an abstract study
in "formal requisites" makes an ideal testing ground for him. Needless to say I
cannot conceive of construing a commercial statute intelligently without first
looking at the legal and business history which went before it, and without
which it may often have little meaning. When Beutel leaves out all of this as he
purports to do, he deals with dry bones. Only in the latter part of the book,
where the transfer of shipping documents is compared with that of drafts, notes
and so on, does the study take on interest.
The writers of the Introductioncautioned their readers: "through all this you
should retain a sneaking suspicion that negotiability is not terribly important,
except to law teachers." Perhaps they are right. In any case I have long had a
"nonsneaking suspicion" that the basic trouble with the commercial law materials lies not so much with Negotiable Instruments as with Sales. While the
search for the person having "the property in the goods" can be made quite
mystifying, not to say exciting, it is scarcely worth the great amount of time
and ingenuity which have been expended on it. Better to abandon the present
arrangement of sales materials according to concept, and go directly to a study
of sales transactions. It is a fair guess that there will emerge in such case, not a
marriage of sales and negotiable instruments, but a sequence.
RoscoE STEFFEN*

Courtroom. By Quentin Reynolds. New York: Farrar, Straus & Co., 1950. Pp.
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In four hundred and nineteen closely packed, clear and extremely well written pages, Quentin Reynolds has attained a high pinnacle as a biographer. This
life of Samuel S. Leibowitz has so much to commend it, that I hardly know
where to begin. Mr. Reynolds has given us a dazzling narrative of a thrilling
professional carrer. It tells in detail some twelve or more of the great cases which
judge Leibowitz handled when he was appearing for the defense. It depicts a
lawyer deeply concerned with the cause of justice, yet well aware how difficult
it is to obtain a verdict of acquittal in the face of public clamor.
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Mr. Reynolds is evidently a student of the great career of the greatest of all
advocates, Thomas Erskine, and without laboring the point, he establishes the
analogy between the Brooklyn lawyer and the man who saved justice for England in the latter part of the eighteenth century. We have no peers in this country, nor lord chancellors, but Samuel Leibowitz, at the age of forty-seven, after
a lifetime in the safeguarding of the basic rights of man, was elevated to the
Kings County Court bench, where he now presides. Mr. Reynolds says,
Today he is moored in the comfortable harbor of the judicial robe, but only a few years
ago he was acknowledged to be the nation's leading criminal lawyer, an advocate in
the tradition of Thomas Erskine.
In "Courtroom" we have not only the record of interesting and important
trials, but the basic philosophy of a man who believed in justice and was willing
and knew how to fight for it-a real presentation of the philosophy that underlies our way of life, a philosophy which declares that every indicted man is
presumed to be innocent and that he shall not suffer the penalty of a conviction
unless a jury is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The basic
theory of our jurisprudence is the concept of a divine law under another name.
Every good man believes in justice in the abstract, but when a given individual
is indicted for a heinous crime, abstract theories are often overborne by a prejudgment of the case and a desire, because of a hatred of the crime, to fasten
guilt upon the man accused; nor is this feeling lessened by the tendency of some
newspapers to inflame the public in advance of trial.
"I hear many people calling out 'Punish the guilty,' " lawyer Leibowitz
once said, "but very few are concerned to clear the innocent."
A terrible crime is committed. The circumstances point to one man as the
perpetrator. "Punish him!" cries the unthinking crowd. "Hang him!" yell the
lynchers, but the law says that he shall not be condemned until after he has had
a fair trial and his guilt has been established to the satisfaction of twelve jurors
who retain no reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
The man indicted stands alone-alone save for the courage and the skill of
a determined advocate, and no one who has ever defended a criminal case has
failed to realize that every man's hand is turned against him and that he too
stands alone. The position, then, of the defender is a lonely one. Only a good
conscience, an honest belief in the rectitude of his course and a valiant courage
may see him through.
How much courage the lawyer for the defense of an unpopular case must
have is dramatically revealed in Mr. Reynolds' throbbing narrative of the
Scottsboro boys. For a New York lawyer to go down into the deep South and
defend these Negroes in an atmosphere of lynch law required intestinal fortitude
of a high order, and Mr. Leibowitz displayed it. In this case, a great lawyer not
only won justice for men indubitably innocent, but struck a blow at ignorant
intolerance. No one can read this chapter and come away without a vast admiration for the hero of Mr. Reynolds' book.
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Next to this case, the one that interested me most was the murder at Beekman Tower. Before the trial of Laura Parr began, the newspapers had tried her
and found her guilty of killing her lover. Her defense was novel, ingenious,
totally convincing and completely ethical. I defy any fair minded reader to
think otherwise, or to study the way in which Leibowitz succeeded finally in
clearing her, without a profound admiration for this great lawyer.
"Dooley Was a Cop" is the title of another chapter which runs the whole
gamut of human emotion. Dooley had shot and killed a man, and who can read
his story without saying to himself, "There but for the grace of God go I"?
judge Leibowitz did not believe that there is such a thing as a criminal type.
"As far as I know," Leibowitz once said to the students of New York University Law School, "I never met or defended a man who was born a criminal,
I don't believe there is such a thing as a 'born' criminal."
Upon this theory he patterned his professional career. He understood human
beings, their weaknesses, their temptations and their fallibility. This understanding gave him that broad and profound sympathy without which no lawyer
would be worth anything in court.
All men believe in justice for themselves but not all are equally willing that it
should be accorded others. There is a place and a need in our society for great
advocates such as Samuel Leibowitz, but they are, I fear, a disappearing race.
"Tell me," he was asked by the author of this book, "how does the present-day
criminal lawyer compare with the lawyer of yesterday?" Leibowitz answered:
Without even considering the great masters of the criminal bar of the nineteenth century, I am sorry to see the modem defense lawyers of eminence like the Darrows, Steuers and Littletons rapidly disappearing from the criminal courtrooms of America, with
few to take their places.
The reason that he assigned for this, he thus expressed:
[Fjirst, there is much more money to be made in almost any other branch of the law.
Second, the criminal law is undoubtedly the most back-breaking branch of the profession and demands trial court talent of the first order. Third, the young lawyer is discouraged from entering this field of the law.
When he was further asked as to whether he thought the law student should
be encouraged to enter criminal practice, he said:
I do indeed! And the law schools could certainly do a better job in training students
for life in the courtroom. Remember that a trial, especially in a criminal court, is more
of a fact suit than a law suit. The troublesome problem confronting the court and jury
is not so much what the law is, as what happened. "Did he steal?" "Did he assault?"
"Did he commit arson?" "Did he kill, and under what circumstances?"
The law schools make no attempt whatever to teach the student how to garner the
necessary facts in the preparation of a case for trial. All that they crowd into the students' heads are abstract legal principles.
How true and how unfortunate this is we all know.
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Read this book. If you are in search of thrills, you will find them; if you are
a student of courtroom technique, it is here revealed. If you believe in justice
but would like to learn how difficult it is to obtain it, study here the record of
one who knew how. If you are interested in human nature, read here of a man
to whom it was an open book. I congratulate Mr. Reynolds upon a splendid performance and especially upon his choice of a subject.
LroYD PAuL ST=R*

The Right To Organize and Its Limits. By Kurt Braun. Washington, D.C.: The
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In this volume the author has attempted to present a scholarly, generalized
comparison of the American and the European concepts of the evolution of the
right of the working man to organize and the limits to such right.
The author has drawn upon all fields of available knowledge. References to
law, both legislative and judicial, economics, politics, and a bit of sociology and
psychology, appear in the various pages. In the present state of overwhelming
but uncollated social data, social knowledge concerning labor problems is at the
same time one of the most unscientific bodies of knowledge and one of the most
fruitful. This work reflects both of these characteristics. The author is preparing
a comprehensive study of what he calls the "rights and duties of organized labor
groups in the United States and selected European countries." This volume
represents his work on what he calls the "right to organize" which is only one
phase of the broad field. The author, while apparently aware of the dangers of
overgeneralized presentation (p. 32), nevertheless states his goal to be that of
presenting a descriptive, that is, objective, approach toward "the right to
organize and its limits." He states his generalized description without basic
criticism or valuation (p. 12).
In order to properly evaluate this work, it is essential to grasp and understand the author's analysis. His subject is divided as follows:
(i) The evolution of the right to organize; (2) an analysis of the nature and
protection of what the author describes as the "freedom to organize" but which
he treats the same as "the right to organize"; (3) a consideration of the nature of
what the author treats as the necessary concomitant to the right to organize,
which he divides into two subheadings, (i) the "Compulsion to Organize"; and
(ii) the "Right of the Individual to Work," that is, without association. Under
each of the foregoing headings there is presented in review the author's generalized observations concerning the United States and selected European
countries, mainly consisting of the United Kingdom, France and Germany.
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